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Abstract 
In this paper we use a heterogeneously endowed Overlapping Generation model (OLG) in an 
experimental framework. . In our experimental OLG economy young subjects are asked either to 
predict the inflation rate for the next period or to decide his/her savings for the current period. 
We find that for both the decisions neither higher amount of government expenditure nor the 
higher amount of money supply by monetary authority will move inflation rate towards 
equilibrium. We also find that that if there is much uncertainty, Friedman Conjecture will not 
work. 
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Saving Decision and Inflation Expectation Decision in Heterogeneously 
Endowed Overlapping Generation Model: An Experimental Evidence from 
Laboratory  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Rules versus Discretion in monetary policy is the classic debate raised by Henry Simon 
(1936). But Friedman (19481, 19602) argued that relatively simple rules may help economic 
stability as agents can easily understand such rules, and it is easier for them to coordinate 
their actions. Friedman proposed that a relatively simple rule, such as a k percent rule, can 
help stabilize the economy. Beside these policy perspectives another important aspect that is 
closely related to policy is the number of equilibrium in a model.  
There are many theoretical papers on this indeterminacy problem, but little work has been 
done to investigate its empirical basis. In their series of papers Marimon and Sunder (1993) 
first use Overlapping Generation (OLG) model in an experimental framework to capture the 
indeterminacy problem. In their 1993 paper they first study indeterminacy of equilibria. They 
did not found any non-stationary rational expectation path. They observed that path of 
inflation rate tends to converge close to, or somewhat below, the low inflationary rate 
stationary state. Marimon Spear and Sunder (1993), provides sunspot equilibria in 
experimental lab framework. They found that “if agents expect sunspots to matter, they can 
matter” (Marimonet al., 1993), more specifically if economic agents believe that some 
random events maters in price determination, such beliefs can be self-fulfilling even if these 
events are extrinsic to the economy. Their data shows that even though the real source of 
uncertainty disappears from the economy, agents’ behaviour may show enough insistence as 
to sunspot fluctuations. In another paper (Marimon & Sunder, 1994) test robustness of their 
previous results under different policy prescriptions. Here they studied agents’ behaviour 
before and after the time of preannounced policy changes. They observed that, after enough 
                                                           
1
“[the] monetary framework should operate under the 'rule of law' rather than the discretionary 
authority of administrators.” 
“It must be granted, however, that the present proposal is less likely to stimulate such a favorable 
psychological climate than a proposal which has a simpler and more easily understood goal, for 
example, a proposal which sets a stable price level as its announced goal.  If the business world were 
sufficiently confident of the ability of the government to achieve the goal, it would have a strong 
incentive to behave in such a way as greatly to simplify the government’s task.”  
2Federal Reserve System “should be instructed to keep the rate of growth as steady as it can” (the 
famous k percent rule). 
  
experience agents learn to anticipate the effects of a preannounced policy change. In this line 
of experiments Marimon & Sunder (1995) and Bernasconi & Kirchkamp (2000) came up 
with a Friedman conjecture: Does a (simple) constant money growth rule help stabilize 
inflation rates compared to a less transparent, or more complex, rule of maintaining a fixed 
level of real deficit? In Marimon & Sunder (1995) subjects were asked to make one inflation 
forecast for one period ahead (knowing past realised inflation) and their result did not support 
the Friedman conjecture. Whereas Bernasconi & Kirchkamp (2000) considered subjects’ 
optimal savings decision with the same theoretical model as Marimon & Sunder (1995)  and 
found the presence of Friedman conjecture. 
In the above experimental structure, subjects’ wealth are homogeneous or fixed at a 
particular level.  Instead of having same wealth we provide different wealth level according 
to their ability to both inter-generational and intra-generational agents in this experiment. 
Here we are studying an overlapping generations (OLG) model where monetary policy is 
known to everyone. We use money as a unique asset to transfer wealth across the two periods 
(young stage to old stage) in which they are alive. We compare the effect of two alternative 
money supply policy rules on inflation rate. We use deficit rule where government can fix the 
level of real deficit and finance it through seigniorage. In this deficit rule the rate of growth of 
money supply is endogenous, while the level of (real) seigniorage is predetermined (fixed, 
and presumably consumed by the government). In contrast to the deficit rule also we use a 
money growth rule where the government fixes the rate of growth of the money supply and 
adjusts the level of public expenditures financed through seigniorage so as to satisfy the 
monetary target. Here the rate of growth of the money supply is predetermined (fixed), while 
the level of (real) seigniorage is endogenous. We provide different wealth levels according to 
their ability3and agents are asked to provide the next period inflation rate expectation in the 
OLG framework. Now if we consider the agent is rational then announcement of  percent 
money growth rule will lead the  percent inflation in the economy through agents’ learning 
process, i.e. realized inflation rate is the announced money-growth rate. So the long-run 
equilibrium can be achieved in the short-run if agents' predictions coincide with the policy 
announcement. 
Section 2 provides a theoretical basis of heterogeneous endowment in OLG model with 
different monetary policies. Section 3 provides detailed experimental design for the 
                                                           
3Detailed structure of the wealth heterogeneity and measurement of ability is provided in the section 
on experimental design (Section 3.3.1) 
  
heterogeneous endowment in the OLG model.  Section 4 provides results and analysis and 
section 4 provides a conclusion.   
 
2. Theoretical Model of Heterogeneous Endowment in an OLG Model and 
Monetary policies 
 
Here we study a standard OLG model, in which fiat money is the only financial asset and 
government revenue is created through seigniorage. Each generation consists of 		agents and 
each agent of each generation lives for two periods and is endowed according to his/her 
ability. An agent   of generation  ,  = 1,2, …	has a two period endowment of a unique 
perishable good (,		 ,		 ) = (		 , 		) , ,	 > ,		 > 0  ,  and his preference over 
consumption C are represented by (,		 ,		 ) = ln(,		 ) + ln(,		 ),where the superscript 
denotes the periods in the agent’s life and k denotes the  generation . An agent  of the initial 
generation that exits in period 1   lives for one period only, and is endowed with , = ,  
of the consumption good. He has an endowment of fiat money ℎ. Given the sequence of 
consumption goods prices∞ in agent  of generation ,  ≥ 1, solves the problem,  !" ln(		 ) + ln(		)          (1) #. 		(,		 − ,		 ) + &(,		 − ,		 ) ≤ 0       (2) 
If the agent knew today’s and tomorrow’s prices then he would optimally save; 
(, = 0.5(,		 − *+,-*+ ,		 )          (3) 
Assuming rational expectations and considering .& = *+*+,- and  .&/ = 01.& , the 
optimum saving decision becomes 
(, = 0.5(,		 − .&/ ,		 )          (4) 
Therefore total savings: 
# = ∑ 0.5(,		 − .&/ ,		 )3          (5) 
Now the per capita savings is; 
( = 4+3 = 3 5∑ 0.5(,		 − .&/ ,		 )3 6        (6) ( = 0.5(7, − .&/ 7, )    
Where,  3 5∑ (,		 )3 6 = 7,   and  3 5∑ (,		 )3 6 = 7,   (1 = 0.5(71,8 − ./71,8 )                            (6/a) 
Now ℎis per capita money supply in period . Here we consider two policy regimes; 
  
1. Real Deficit Regime: Government finances a constant per capita level of deficit 9  
through seigniorage. 
2. Money Growth Regime: The monetary authority allows money to grow by a constant 
factor of  µ and adjusts the level of seigniorage to satisfy the monetary target 
Now for the first money supply policy regime: 
ℎ = ℎ1 + 9           (7) 
And for the second money supply policy regime: 
	ℎ = µℎ1            (8) 
By setting = 1, when 9 ≠ 0 and  ≠ 1 when d = 0, the per capita money supply in real 
terms,  = ;+*+ is given by  
  = <=+>-?+ + 9           (9) 
The equilibrium price for any period is such that the per capita aggregatesupply ( equals the 
per capita aggregate (real) money supply i.e.: ( =                       (10) 
Following Marimon and Sunder (1995) and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (1999), equation (6), 
(6/a), (9) and (10) give the equilibrium map 
Φ(.&/ , ./ , .) = 0                    (11) 
i.e..&,/ − @A, − 9BC +  DE+>-,F1?+,FG HIJ,F?+ = 0                 (12) 
Where,  A, = K7+,J-K7+,JL ,	B = K7+,J-  and M8 = K7+,J
L
K7+>-,FL  
Now the actual inflation rate can be expressed as a function of expected inflation rate in the 
current and following periods 
. =  DE+>-,F1?+,FG HIJ,F(E+,J1N/1?+,-,JG )                   (13) 
Equation (13) describes the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. This is known as actual 
law of motion for . given the expectations and the monetary regime. Now assuming rational 
expectation hypothesis. = .,8/  and  .& = .&,/  coincides with the equilibrium of the 
economy. 
. =  @E+>-,F1?+CIJ,F(E+,J1N/1?+,-)                   (14)                            
Now at equilibrium . = .& 
Therefore it becomes  
  
. − OA, − 9B + <IJ,FP . + <E+>-,FIJ,F                   (15) 
ForOA, − 9B + <IJ,FP
 > 4 <E+>-,FIJ,F  there are two solutions that satisfy the stationarity condition 
Φ(.&/ , ./ , .) = 0 . Where the roots are 
RE+,J1N/& STJ,FU±WRE+,J1N/& STJ,FU
L1XSY+>-,FTJ,F                  (16) 
Here we can define two equilibra as .Z (Low Inflation Stationary State or Low ISS) and .[ 
(High Inflation Stationary State or High ISS). One important point is that irrespective of the 
regime both .Z and .[are monetary equilibria. 
 
3. Design of Experiment 
 
Experiments were conducted at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India.  In the first phase of 
our experiment we generate heterogeneous endowment for subjects, and in the second phase 
of our experiment we run the main OLG model experiment.   
Details of the instructions are in Appendix A. 
First Phase: 
In our main experimental environment (second phase) we are dealing with agents with 
heterogeneous endowment. To calculate the endowment for each subject, in this phase we 
test the subjects’ ability to identify and count simple symbols through a questionnaire. 
According to the score of the game we provide endowments to the subjects. (Sample 
Questionnaire in Appendix B) 
At first subjects are asked to mention their name and department. On doing so, everyone 
was given a unique code number. In the next phase this unique code number is used as an 
identification number. Now the participants are asked to complete a questionnaire comprising 
of 10 tasks within 1 minute and for each correct answer the subject scores 1 point. Hence 
each of them can get a maximum of 10 points from a questionnaire. This game is played 34 
times. So, one at a time the participants completed 34 questionnaires.  The points earned from 
each questionnaire determined the endowment level for each round (generation) for the next 
phase. We announce, in this phase, that higher the number of correct answers from each 
questionnaire, higher will be the endowment for each round but we did   not explain what will 
happen in the next phase. 
 
  
Second Phase: 
In our experimental market subjects can buy and sell a commodity (we call it a chip) in a 
sequence of market periods. There is a fixed number, \, (\ ≥ 3) of participants in each 
session. In our experiment we consider 15 subjects. At the beginning of each market period 
subjects are assigned their specific role: 
Young:  subjects enter the market as a young consumer. In our experiment we consider 
5 subjects as young( = 5). 
Old:  subjects act as old consumers and leave the market at the end of the period. In our 
experiment we consider 5 subjects as old ( = 5).  
Reserve: \ − 2	(≥ )subjects stay outside for their turn to enter as young consumers. 
.In our experiment we consider 5 subjects as reserve, (\ − 2 = 5). Moreover one may 
consider more than 5 subjects as reserve and take randomly 5 subjects as young.  
 After entering as a young consumer at period  subject received an endowment of ^,  
units, where superscript 1 represent  young therefore ^, represents the score of	ℎ	 subject 
at 	ℎ	 questionnaire of first phase. As the chips are perishable in nature, young subject 
cannot move with chip to the next period for their old age. Therefore young only may 
consume some of these chips instantly () and sell the remaining chips to old consumers and 
to the government	(# = ^, − ). In return to selling the chips they receive experimental 
money which a subject can carry to their old age for next period. In the old age consumer 
consume   amount of chips ( = ^ + #(/&). Where ^ = ^, /6 . We use this 
proportion to make the difference between young age endowment and old age endowment 
higher. Subjects have to consume all of their endowment in the old age as there is no bequest 
effect of endowment in the model. 
In case where the first period itself is the exit period subjects will receive the exit period 
endowment (^ ). In addition, to this endowment each of the first exit period subjects 
received an amount of rupees (ℎ) from the experimenter at the beginning of this period. 
These participants have to use all these money to buy chips during the exit period because the 
money they hold at the end of an exit period are worthless as there is no bequest effect in the 
model; 
The number of chips consumed in both the young () and old age () determine the 
payoff of the subjects. 
After completion of a  period, say , a young consumer becomes an old consumer in the 
next period i.e. for  + 1	 period, old consumers become reserve subjects and   subjects are 
  
randomly selected from the reserve subjects of   − 1 period as a young consumer for  + 1 
period. This process continues for34 periods. Therefore a subject re-enters the market as a 
young with memory and experience of the game as a bequest effect4 but they do not have 
access to the accumulated earning from previous periods. 
The history of prices and optimum savings (in percentage form) are also displayed on 
every subject’s computer screens. 
 
3.1 Trading Rules 
Standard OLG models are silent on the mechanism of trading process between old and 
young. Lim, Prescott, and Sunder (1994) started with single-unit double auction process but 
that was error-prone5. Marimom and Sunder (1995) and Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2009) 
used a very simple process to calculate the supply of chips from young agents. 
Depending on the treatments at the beginning of   th period young subject are asked to 
submit either a price ratio of the following period or to submit their optimal savings decision 
for the period. In case of Inflation rate expectation treatments following formula determines 
the individual supply decision.: (, = 0.5(	,	 − .,&/ ,		 ), (, ≥ 0.  
The individual supplies from young agents are summed to determine the economy's chip 
supply for the current period. 
 Depending on the treatments, all subjects other than the young (old and reserve) are also 
asked to submit either a price ratio for the following period or optimal savings decision at the 
same time as the young. In this time they are endowed with corresponding period’s earnings 
from phase 1. Subjects are rewarded for prediction in a way such that the more accurate the 
prediction, greater will be the prize. They are awarded in next period when actual price is 
generated. In case of saving decision treatments savings decision of the current period 
determined the price ratio for the next period  
(, = 0.5(,		 − .&/ ,		 )         (4) 
Therefore .,&/ = aJ,+1KJ	,+	-KJ,+		L                    (4a) 
                                                           
4For more detail see Mrimon and Sunder (1993), Lemma 1. 
5Lim, Prescott, and Sunder (1994) started out using single-unit double auction with the provision that 
the last transaction of an old subject in any period could be for a fractional unit to enable him or her to 
use up all the cash for consumption. This mechanism was awkward, slow, and error-prone, with many 
old subjects carrying money to their “graves”. Cash balances left in the hands of the old caused 
unintended variations in the supply of money in the experimental economy. This is explained in 
Marimon& Sunder (1995) 
  
 And      (.&/ = *b+,-*b+ ).                     (4b) 
In period , only the young agents’ savings were added to determine the “chip” supply. 
The aggregate money was generated by the sum of the real cash balance in the hands of the 
old, plus the expenditure policy of the government. Under the fixed deficit regime, 
experimenter (acting as government) buys c = 9(where 9 is per capita deficit) chips every 
period at market clearing price to increase the amount of money circulation. Government’s 
demand is added to the demand of the old to arrive at the market demand function. Under the 
money growth regime market demand is adjusted for growth in the amount of money in 
circulation at a constant factor 	in each period. 
The market clearing price is determined by the point of intersection between these supply 
and demand functions. Actual price is public information. But the amount of money earned 
by the young agent is strictly private information. The history of prices is also displayed on 
their computer screens. 
 
3.2Terminal Condition 
Standard OLG model is an infinite horizon model, termination condition may affect the 
equilibrium. Therefore it is very difficult to run OLG model in an experimental setup6 . 
Marimon & Sunder (1993) showed that with no announcement in advance, if at the end of 
some period of the experimental session participants are informed that was the last period of 
the session, then this does not hamper the Nash Equilibrium condition. Here we also use this 
terminal condition. 
 
3.3 Payoff 
First phase: 
For participation in the first phase of the experiment we have paid a flat payment of 
Rs.50. Participations were informed that irrespective of their score they will be paid Rs.50 for 
their participation. We also informed them that lower the score lower is the opportunity to 
earn higher payment in second phase.   
 
 
 
                                                           
6
 Aliprantis and Plott (1993) implement a finite period OLG model. 
  
Second Phase: 
The combination of entry-exit period consumption determines the amount of money 
they earn which implies the subjects are paid for their choice of 	!9	  according to the 
following payment rule; 
max	0, B(ghi + 	ghi)                  (17) 
WhereB  is a constant term.This payoff mechanism indicates that multiplicative product 
(product of entry level and exit level) of chips consumption and amount of their money 
earning are proportional i.e. the higher is the multiplicative product of chips consumption, 
higher is the amount of their money earning.  
The participants for whom the first period is the exit period the amount of money earned is: 
B(ghi)                     (18) 
Since the young have incentive to earn more in the next period, therefore we need not provide 
further incentive for taking a savings decision. But, to induce the old and the reserve to take 
optimal savings decisions we have to provide an incentive. Therefore, the old and reserve 
players can also earn by providing their optimum savings decisions for each period. When 
subjects take decisions on their optimal savings (saving decision treatments) they are also 
indirectly making the inflation expectations decision through equation (4a). We pay subjects 
according to the optimal inflation expectation decision generated by their saving decision. 
Therefore the following formula is used for payment 
max	0, B D1 − jk(*+,- *+)1(*b+,- *b+)⁄⁄(*+,- *+⁄ ) mjH                 (19) 
Where B is a constant term and (b& b)⁄  is the prediction of price ratios. 
  
3.4 Treatments 
To maintain proper experimental control in the lab we take one group per experimental 
session. Our two main objectives are (i) to test for the existence of the Friedman conjecture 
(1948, 1960) in heterogeneous wealth framework both in saving decision and Inflation rate 
expectation decision and (ii) to test the nature of equilibria in OLG framework. To test for the 
Friedman conjecture we asked subjects’ either to take a decision on inflation rate expectation 
(IE) or to take decision on saving (S) and used two types of money supply policy namely 
Real Deficit rule (RD) and Money Growth rule (MG). We also change the per capita deficit 
(9)value and money growth parameter() as a treatment variable.Details of the treatments 
are  in following Table 1. 
 
  
Table 1 about here  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Twelve experimental sessions were run for 24 independent groups of 15 subjects each for 
over 31-34 rounds. We have generated 23176 data points7 from 360 subjects. Though we had 
run the experimental session for 31 to 34 rounds but for our analysis we have considered only 
the first 30 periods. 
 
4.1 Basic Results 
The main focuses of this paper are to test the nature of the equilibrium and the existence 
of the Friedman conjecture. Before that we first see the basic statistics of the two decisions. 
One important point is that irrespective of the monetary policy rule as money supply 
increases inflation rate also increases. Another important point is that mean actual inflation 
rate and expected inflation rate is (almost) equal to the money growth parameter in case of 
money growth rule treatments. In case of inflation expectation decision treatments we 
directly get the inflation rate expectation data but in case of saving decision we calculate 
subjects’ inflation expectation from their saving decision data using equation (4a).  
Detail results are in the following Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here  
 
Now we turn to savings behavior. In case of inflation expectation decision treatments we 
calculate subjects’ saving decision using equation (4) but in case of saving decision 
treatments we directly get the optimal savings rate decision. Detail results are in the 
following Table 3. 
Table 3 about here  
 
4.2 Nature of Equilibrium 
In our experiment we are using both inter and intra generational endowment 
heterogeneity which is a novelty over existing literature. Now if we closely go through the 
equilibrium of the model given by 
                                                           
7Data points on actual inflation: 736; Data points on expected inflation: 11040; and Savings Decision: 
11400 
  
. =
OA, − 9B + M,8P ± WOA, − 9B + M,8P
 − 4A1,8M,8
2  
We find the following two important properties: 
a. Due to this heterogeneity in endowment model’s equilibrium varies over time.  
b. Irrespective of the regime (Real deficit rule regime or money growth rule regime) 
both the equilibrium (High ISS and Low ISS) are monetary in nature. 
Now we move to our experimental results. Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show 
the time series of both the equilibrium values of inflation rates and realized inflation rate for 
both the regimes (for both decision).   
 
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here  
 
It is well established (Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994, 1995) and Bernasconi and 
Kirchkamp (2009)) that in this setup subjects converge closely to the low ISS. Our 
experiment shows that realized inflation is converging to low ISS in case of money growth 
rule regime for all the treatments. But in case of real deficit rule regime we find only 
treatment 1 and treatment 7 (low deficit, 9=0.20; Fig 1: S_1, S_2 and Fig 3: S_13 and S_14) 
is converging to the low ISS. In case of high deficit treatment (Fig 1: S_3, S_4, S_5 , S_6 and 
Fig 3: S_15, S_16, S_17, S_18) in this regime realized inflation is not only lower than the 
low ISS but also the divergence increases as deficit increases. Therefore our experimental 
result shows that as the deficit increases low ISS moves towards high ISS. 
To confirm this fact we consider the absolute difference between actual inflation and 
low ISS (9nn) and regress it on deficit parameter (9) in case of real deficit regime and on 
growth parameter () incase of money growth regime along with a constant. Detail regression 
results are shown in the following Table 4 
Table 4 about here  
In the regression we see that coefficient of policy parameter comes out positively 
significant, which indicates that higher the value of the policy variable higher will be the 
divergence. Therefore from the policy perspective we can say that neither higher amount of 
government expenditure nor the higher amount of money supply by monetary authority will 
anchor towards equilibrium. 
 
 
  
4.3 Inflation rate Volatility and the Friedman Conjecture 
Friedman conjecture (1948, 1960) is one of the research questions of our experimental 
analysis in the two monetary regimes. Here we want to check whether a constant growth of 
the money supply stabilizes inflation better than a constant real deficit rule. To study this 
conjecture, we look at three different measures for volatility. Among them two are objective 
type: an absolute one (opq = g|. − .1|) and a relative one (ops = gg(. .1⁄ )); and 
one is subjective, (oa = ln	(t(./) .u/⁄ )), where t(./)is the standard deviation of a subject’s 
inflation rate expectation and .u/  is the mean expectation of the subject. In all cases we take 
logs to reduce skewness. The cumulative distributions are shown for the two regimes in the 
following Figure 5.  
Figure 5 about here  
 
In case of subjective variance measurements of these forecasts are centered very 
closely around a single level, the individual might be in a relatively stable situation. If, 
however, forecasts are scattered over a large interval, an individual is apparently less certain 
about the situation of the economy, which we interpret as the perception of a more volatile 
situation. 
In case of inflation expectation decision all the three types of volatility measure show 
that money growth regime is much steeper than real deficit regime. This indicates that, the 
individuals are apparently less certain about the condition of the economy in case of real 
deficit regime. Thus we can infer that under real deficit regime, the perception of individuals 
appears to be more volatile. Where as in case of saving decision, The first and the third types 
of volatility measure show that real deficit regime is much steeper than money growth 
regime. This indicates that, the individuals are apparently less certain about the condition of 
the economy in case of money growth policy regime. Thus we can infer that under money 
growth regime, the perception of individuals appears to be more volatile. And second 
volatility measure we find that partly real deficit regime is steeper and partly money growth 
regime is steeper. Therefore we cannot come to any certain conclusion on the basis of this 
measurement. 
To see the effect of policy regimes in our experimental economies we ran regressions, 
with volatility measure as a dependent variable and policy regime as an independent variable. 
Table 5 summaries the regression results. 
Table 5 about here  
  
 
In case of inflation rate expectation decision treatments we found that, regardless of what 
indicator we consider, the constant real deficit rule always leads to more inflation volatility 
than the constant money growth rule. Thus, in contrast to Marimon and Sunder (1995), our 
evidence apparently gives some support to the Friedman's conjecture. Where as in case of 
saving decision treatments, we found that, except for the second measure of volatility, the 
money growth rule always leads to more inflation rate volatility than the real deficit rule. This 
result indicates that existence of Friedman Conjecture (1960) is not verified. Thus, in contrast 
to Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2009), our evidence apparently gives some support to 
Marimon & Sunder (1995). 
 
5. Conclusion 
In our experimental economy we incorporate the wealth heterogeneity in both inter and 
intra generation according to their ability, which is a novelty of this experiment over 
existing literature. In our model economy we consider two types of policy regime; namely 
real deficit regime and money growth regime. In our model there are two types of monetary 
equilibrium arising for both the regimes. Within these two regimes we also consider the 
variation of the regimes by incorporating different values of policy parameters. And as these 
equilibrium is dependent on the wealth, therefore the equilibrium varies over time. Along 
with these monetary policies we consider two types of decisions. In our experimental OLG 
economy young subjects are asked either to predict the inflation rate for the next period or 
to decide his/her savings for the current period. From their predictions on inflation we 
calculate how much of his wealth he want to save for his old time and from their decision 
on savings, we calculate his/ her predicted inflation rate for the next period. The interaction 
between old and young determine the current price of the chip. 
Main focuses of this experiment are to explain the nature of equilibrium and investigate 
the Friedman conjecture. 
We find that for both the decisions neither higher amount of government expenditure 
nor the higher amount of money supply by monetary authority will move inflation rate 
towards equilibrium.  
In inflation expectation decision treatments we found that a constant growth of the 
money supply stabilizes inflation better than a constant real deficit rule. Therefore our 
experimental result support the Friedman conjecture. Where as in saving decision 
  
treatments we found that constant real deficit rule stabilizes inflation rate better than 
constant growth of the money supply. Therefore our experimental results do not support the 
Friedman Conjecture. More specifically when people are taking decision on savings, they 
are more uncertain about the future than when predicting inflation rate for next period and 
we find that in savings decision, Friedman Conjecture is not validated. Thus we may 
conclude that if there is much uncertainty, Friedman Conjecture will not work.  
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Table 1: Treatments 
No Session Policy Periods Subjects 
,  
Decision Deficit per Capita  
Money Growth 
Parameter 
1 1-2 RD 30,33 (15,5) IE 0.20 1 
2 3 - 4 RD 32,34 (15,5) IE 1 1 
3 5 - 6 RD 33,30 (15,5) IE 1.5 1 
4 7- 8 MG 32,30 (15,5) IE 0 1.1 
5 9-10 MG 33,31 (15,5) IE 0 1.5 
6 11-12 MG 30,32 (15,5) IE 0 2 
7 13-14 RD 30,33 (15,5) S 0.20 1 
8 15-16 RD 32,34 (15,5) S 1 1 
9 17-18 RD 33,30 (15,5) S 1.5 1 
10 19- 20 MG 32,30 (15,5) S 0 1.1 
11 21-22 MG 33,31 (15,5) S 0 1.5 
12 23-24 MG 30,32 (15,5) S 0 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Basic Results on Inflation Rate Expectation  
 
T1 
 = 0.20 
T2 
 = 1.00 
T3 
 = 1.50 
T4 
 = 1.10 
T5 
 = 1.50 
T6 
 = 2.0 
T7 
 = 0.20 
T8 
 = 1.00 
T9 
 = 1.50 
T10 
 = 1.10 
T11 
 = 1.50 
T12 
 = 2.0 
 
S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 S_6 S_7 S_8 S_9 S_10 S_11 S_12 S_13 S_14 S_15 S_16 S_17 S_18 S_19 S_20 S_21 S_22 S_23 S_24 
 
Inflation Rate Expectation Decision Saving Decision 
 
Only for Experimental Economy 
Mean Actual Inflation 
Rate 1.01 1.03 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.13 1.09 1.10 1.50 1.50 2.00 1.99 1.14 1.10 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.50 1.50 2.00 2.01 
SD of Actual Inflation  
Rate 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.27 0.23 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.21 0.19 
Mean Inflation  Rate 
Expectation 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.10 1.49 1.48 2.00 1.99 1.13 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.08 1.12 1.49 1.49 1.99 1.99 
SD of Inflation  Rate 
Expectation 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.20 
 For All Subjects in a Session 
Mean Inflation  Rate 
Expectation 1.02 1.05 1.10 1.07 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.49 1.50 2.00 1.14 1.14 1.08 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.52 1.48 1.96 1.96 1.14 
SD of Inflation  Rate 
Expectation 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.25 
 
Table 3: Basic Results on Saving Behavior 
  
T1 
 = 0.20 
T2 
 = 1.00 
T3 
 = 1.50 
T4 
 = 1.10 
T5 
 = 1.50 
T6 
 = 2.0 
T7 
 = 0.20 
T8 
 = 1.00 
T9 
 = 1.50 
T10 
 = 1.10 
T11 
 = 1.50 
T12 
 = 2.0 
 
S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 S_6 S_7 S_8 S_9 S_10 S_11 S_12 S_13 S_14 S_15 S_16 S_17 S_18 S_19 S_20 S_21 S_22 S_23 S_24 
 
Inflation Rate Expectation Decision Saving Decision 
 
Only for Experimental Economy 
Mean 
Saving 33.35 32.74 31.88 32.10 31.83 31.85 31.55 31.72 25.20 25.27 16.68 16.86 31.14 32.19 32.20 31.89 32.07 31.67 31.98 31.37 25.15 25.21 16.84 16.83 
SD of 
Saving 3.26 3.36 3.41 2.10 1.27 1.51 2.19 2.58 2.44 2.30 4.32 3.09 6.57 4.83 2.32 2.70 1.62 1.46 2.84 2.45 3.01 2.59 3.65 4.01 
 For All Subjects in a Session 
Mean 
Saving 38.74 38.34 37.81 38.07 37.76 37.80 37.66 35.81 33.42 33.39 27.80 27.70 37.36 37.50 38.04 37.92 38.14 37.82 37.62 37.63 33.19 33.55 28.13 28.16 
SD of 
Saving 4.49 4.70 4.89 4.54 4.36 4.41 4.67 9.84 6.15 6.04 8.49 8.03 5.87 4.78 4.43 4.63 4.48 4.52 5.09 5.15 6.73 6.87 9.20 9.24 
 
 
 
Table 4: Role of policy parameter on difference between actual inflation and low ISS 
 
 Inflation Expectation Decision Saving Decision 
  =  +   =  +   =  +   =  +  
 
0.5258*** 
(0.0275) 
0.4833*** 
(0.0301) 
0.4354*** 
(0.0404) 
0.3045*** 
(0.0382) 
 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0288) 
0.0488 
(0.0315) 
-0.4582*** 
(0.0637) 
-0.32032*** 
(0.0604) 
Adj.  0.6787 0.5972 0.3999 0.2646 
                  is a constant included in the regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance  
             at 1/5/10 percent level. 
 
 
Table 5: Inflation volatility and the Friedman Conjecture 
 Inflation Expectation Decision Saving Decision 
  = 	 +   = 	 +   = 	 +   = 	 +   = 	 +   = 	 +  
 
0 .2625* 
(0.1448) 
1.2041*** 
(0.2867) 
0.1739*** 
(0.0394) 
-0.2839* 
(0.1504) 
0.0546 
(0.2961) 
0.6120*** 
(0.0364) 
 
-3.0169*** 
(0.1024) 
-6.8268*** 
(0.2028) 
-2.0274*** 
(0.0278) 
-2.3733*** 
(0.1062) 
-5.5416*** 
(.2094) 
-1.3983*** 
(0.0257) 
Adj.  ! 0.0068 0.0473 0.0938 0.0106 -0.0029 0.6112 
 is a dummy variable that is 1 for the real deficit rule and 0 for money growth rule,  is a constant included in the regression. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent level. 
 
  
              Low  ISS                                                High ISS                                                     Actual inflation   
Fig 1: Time series of equilibrium values and actual inflation rate in a real defecit regime. (inflation expectation decision) 
 
  Low  ISS                                                 High ISS                                                   Actual inflation  
Fig 2: Time series of equilibrium values and actual inflation rate in a money growth regime. (inflation expectation decision) 
  
 LowISS                              High ISS                           Actual inflation rate 
Fig 3: Time series of equilibrium values and actual inflation rate in a real defecit regime. (Saving decision) 
  
 
 LowISS                              High ISS                           Actual inflation rate 
Fig 4: Time series of equilibrium values and actual inflation rate in a money growth regime. (Saving decision) 
  
Appendix A 
Instruction for Participants 
(This instruction is used for inflation expectation decision experiment) 
Overview of the Experiment 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment being conducted by the Centre for 
Experiments in Social and Behavioral Sciences, Department of Economics, Jadavpur 
University. This is an experiment in decision making. The instructions are simple, please 
follow them carefully.The money you earn depends on the decisions you and others make. 
You will make decisions with the help of the computer. This money will be paid to you in cash 
at the end of the experiment. 
Now imagine you are a citizen of an imaginary economy.  The imaginary economy 
will be created by a computer programme. This experiment is divided into many periods. Your 
role may change from period to period. You will have the opportunity to buy and sell chips. 
Your main task is to predict the next period price ratio on the basis of previous price. The 
currency used in this market is rupee. The only use of this currency is to buy and sell chips. It 
has no other use. The procedures for determining the amount of rupee you take home with you 
is explained later in these instructions. 
You will participate in a market for two consecutive periods at a time. Let us call the 
first of these periods your entry period (because you begin your participation in the market), 
and the-second your exit period (because you end your participation in the market). Different 
individuals may have different entry and exit periods. You may enter and exit more than once 
depending on the number of periods for which the market is operated. 
Trading and Recording Rules 
1. All entry-period players are sellers and all exit-period players (and possibly the 
experimenter) are buyers. At the beginning of the entry or exit period you will receive 
an amount of chips (endowment; depending on the points gained in the first part). This 
endowment will be always greater in your entry period, when you are young than your 
exit period (one sixth of the young age) as old. You cannot carry the chips from one 
period to the next. You can sell your savings at young age and earn money. This 
money will be carried forward in the old age. On the other hand you have to exhaust all 
of your earnings by consuming chips in the exit period.  
  
2. Every exit period player (old) pays his entire money to entry-period players (Young) in 
exchange for chips at a market price determined in the manner explained below. 
3. At the beginning of each period the young   must state the prediction of price ratio for 
the following period ( = 1 + inlation	rate). Predictions will be used to determine 
the number of chips they wish to sell according to the following formula. 
, = 0.5(		 − ( /)		")       (1) 
Notice that higher the price ratio when you enter, the fewer the number of chips you 
will sell. Where 		   is endowment for young age and 		"  is endowment for old age. 
4. After considering the rupee available from the exit player (old), offers made by entry 
players(young)and experimenter's policy (government)about financing the debt with 
rupee and/or incrementing the quantity of, rupee in circulation, the market clearing 
price is computed and announced. Exit players (old) and the experimenter pay this 
price for each chip they buy. Each entry player (young) will be informed of the number 
of chips he/she has been able to sell at the market price and each exit-period player 
(old)will be told of the number of chip that he/she has been able to buy with his/her 
money on hand. 
5. Old and reserve players can also earn. For that you have to submit the price ratio of the 
following period at the same time as the young. In this time you are endowed with 
corresponding period’s earnings from phase1. Each exit (old) and reserve players 
receives a reward one period later, depending on how close his/her, prediction of price 
ratio is to the actually observed price ratio. At the end of that period, the experimenter 
announces the most accurate, predicted price ratio and the market price ratio. 
6. After transaction information is received, through the computer each entry player 
(young) can compute the chips remaining on hand (consume). The rupee received from 
sale will be used to buy chips in the exit period which follows immediately. 
7. Each exit player (old) records the number of chips purchased on their record sheet. 
Then the experimenter computes the rupee earned by using formula (2) or (2') given 
below.  
8. The experimenter may terminate the market at any time. Without any announcement in 
advance, the participants will be informed which is the last period of the experiment; 
rupee held by all entry-period players (young) are converted into chips using the 
market-clearing price of the following period. 
  
9.  At the end of the experiment, add up the earnings and prediction rewards columns of 
your Information and Record Sheet. The experimenter will pay you the sum of these 
(your cumulative earnings) in rupees. 
 
Payoffs 
The amount of rupee you will earn to take home with you for any pair of entry-exit periods 
will be: 
max{0, &('() * + '()*")}         (2) 
Where &, the conversion rate, is set to 10. 
This means that the greater the product of chips you consume at the end of your entry 
and exit periods, the greater amount of money you earn to take home with you. 
For some of you, however, this first period itself will be an exit period and you will 
receive the exit period endowment ("). In addition, each of you for whom the first period is 
an exit period will receive an amount of Rs.5 from the experimenter at the beginning of this 
period. These participants have to use these entire rupees to buy chips during the exit period 
because the rupees you hold at the end of an exit period are worthless;  
The payoff of such first exit period individuals at the end of Period 1 will be: 
&('(),")           (2') 
All the money you earn by predicting  / will be added after all the rounds and 
will be paid to you at the end of the session. 
Earning for Old and Reserve Players 
The following formula is used for payment for trading rule  
max	{0, & -1 − ./( )0( )⁄⁄( ⁄ ) 2.3}        
Where &, the conversion rate, is set to 10. and (  )⁄  is the prediction of price ratios. 
 
Other Instructions 
During the experiment sessions, it is strictly forbidden to speak with other students who 
participate in the experiment. Doing so can lead to the exclusion from the experiment. In this 
case, no payment will be made. If you have any questions or problems during the course of the 
experiment, raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you. Please do not ask aloud. 
 
If you have any questions please ask now! 
  
Instruction for Participants 
(This instruction is used for saving decision experiment) 
 
Overview of the Experiment 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment being conducted by the Centre for 
Experiments in Social and Behavioral Sciences, Department of Economics, Jadavpur 
University. This is an experiment in decision making. The instructions are simple, please 
follow them carefully. The money you earn depends on the decisions you and others make. 
You will make decisions with the help of the computer. This money will be paid to you in cash 
at the end of the experiment. 
Now imagine you are a citizen of an imaginary economy.  The imaginary economy 
will be created by a computer programme. This experiment is divided into many periods. Your 
role may change from period to period. You will have the opportunity to buy and sell chips. 
Your main task is to determine your own optimum saving on the basis of previous price. The 
currency used in this market is rupee. The only use of this currency is to buy and sell chips. It 
has no other use. The procedures for determining the amount of rupee you take home with you 
is explained later in these instructions. 
You will participate in a market for two consecutive periods at a time. Let us call the 
first of these periods your entry period (because you begin your participation in themarket), 
and the second your exit period (because you end your participation in the market). Different 
individuals may have different entry and exit periods. We shall tell you when you enter and 
exit the market. You may enter and exit more than once depending on the number of periods 
for which the market is operated. 
 
Trading and Recording Rules 
1. All entry-period players are sellers and all exit-period players (and possibly the 
experimenter) are buyers. At the beginning of the entry or exit period you will receive 
an amount of chips (endowment; depending on the points gained  in the first part). This 
endowment will be always greater in your entry period, when you are young than your 
exit period (one sixth of the young age) as old. You cannot carry the chips from one 
period to the next. You can sell your saving at young age and earn money. This money 
  
will be carried  forward in the old age. On the other hand you have to exhaust all of 
your earning by consuming chips in the exist period.  
2.  Every exit-period player (old) pays all his money to entry-period players (young) in 
exchange for chips at a market price determined in the manner explained below. 
3. At the beginning of each period the young   must state there saving decision for the 
current period. This saving decision will be used to calculate the prediction of price 
ratio ( = 1 + inlation	rate) for the following period. The following formula is 
used to determine the inflation rate: 
, = 0.5(		 − ( /)		")       (1) 
Notice that lowers the chips you sell higher will be the price ratio. Where 		   is 
endowment for young age and 		"  is endowment for old age. 
4. After considering the rupee available from the exit players (old), offers made by entry 
players (young) and experimenter's policy (government) about financing the debt with 
rupee and/or incrementing the quantity of rupee in circulation, the market-clearing 
price is computed and announced. Exit players (old) and the experimenter pay this 
price for each chip they buy. Each entry player (young) will be informed of the number 
of chips he/she has been able to sell at the market price, and each exit-period player 
(old) will be told of the number of chips that he/she has been able to buy with his/her 
money on hand. 
5. Old and reserve player can also earn. For that you have to submit their saving decision 
for current period at the same time as the young. In this time you are endowed with 
corresponding period’s earnings from phase 1. Each exit (old) and reserve players 
receive a reward one period later, depending on how close his/her prediction of price 
ratio is to the actually observed price ratio. This price ratio will be calculated through 
their saving decision (equation a).  At the end of that period, the experimenter 
announces the most accurate, predicted price ratio and the market price ratio.  
6. After transaction information is received, through the computer, each entry player 
(young) can compute the chips remaining on hand (consume). The rupee received from 
sale will be used to buy chips in the exit period which follows immediately. 
7. Each exit player (old) records the number of chips purchased on their record sheet. 
Then the experimenter computes the rupee earned by using formula (2) or (2') given 
below.  
  
8. The experimenter may terminate the market at any time. Without any announcement in 
advance, the participants will be informed which is the last period of the experiment; 
rupee held by all entry-period players (young) are converted into chips using the 
market-clearing price of the following period.  
9. At the end of the experiment, add up the earnings and prediction rewards columns of 
your Information and Record Sheet. The experimenter will pay you the sum of these 
(your cumulative earnings) in rupees. 
 
Payoff 
The number of "rupee" you will earn to take home with you for any pair of entry-exit 
periods will be: 
4,5{0, &('(), + '(),")}         (2) 
Where &, the conversion rate, is set to 10.  
This means that the greater the product of chips you consume at the endof your entry 
and exit periods, the greater amount of money you earn to take home with you. 
For some of you, however, this first period itself will be an exit period and you will 
receive the exit period endowment ("). In addition, each of you for whom the first period is 
an exit period will receive an amount of Rs.5 from the experimenter at the beginning of this 
period. These participants have to use these entire rupees to buy chips during the exit period 
because the rupees you hold at the end of an exit period are worthless;  
The payoff of such first exit period individuals at the end of Period 1 will be: 
&('(),")           (2') 
All the money you earn by taking decision on saving will be added after all the round 
and will be paid to you at the end of the session. 
Earning for Old and Reserve Players 
The following formula is used for payment for trading rule 
max	{0, & -1 − ./( )0( )⁄⁄( ⁄ ) 2.3}        
Where &, the conversion rate, is set to 10. and (  )⁄  is the prediction of price ratios. 
 
Other Instructions 
During the experiment sessions, it is strictly forbidden to speak with other students who 
participate in the experiment. Doing so can lead to the exclusion from the experiment. In this 
  
case, no payment will be made. If you have any questions or problems during the course of the 
experiment, raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you. Please do not ask aloud. 
If you have any questions please ask now! 
 
  
Appendix B 
 
Sample Question 
 
Name :..............................................................................     Code:.................................... 
Page _1 
 
 
1 
 
0oo00o00o0o0o00o0o0o00o0o000000o0ooo00 o0o0o0 
 
 
How many 0 s are there: 
 
2 
 
!!!!IIIIII!!II!!!III!!!!IIII!!!!III!!!!!!III!!!II!!!!!IIII!!!III!!I 
 
 
How many I s are there: 
 
3 
 
$@@@$$@@$$@$@$@$@@@@$@$@$$@$$$$@ 
 
 
How many @  are there: 
 
4 
 
£€€€££€€€€€££€€€£££€€£€£€£€€€€££€€£€£££€€£€£€€ 
 
 
How many € s are there: 
 
5 
 
Ɨ++++ƗƗ++ƗƗƗ++ƗƗƗ+++++ƗƗƗ++ƗƗƗƗ++ƗƗƗ+ƗƗ++++ƗƗƗ++ƗƗƗ++ 
 
 
How many + s are there: 
 
6 
 
φϕϕφϕϕφφφφϕϕφφϕϕϕφφφϕϕφϕφϕφϕϕφφφϕϕϕφφφ
ϕφϕϕ 
 
 
How many φ s are there: 
 
7 
 
ϵϵ϶϶϶ϵ϶϶ϵϵϵ϶϶ϵ϶ϵ϶ϵϵ϶϶ϵϵϵ϶϶϶϶϶ϵϵ϶϶϶ϵϵ϶϶϶ϵϵ϶
϶ϵ϶ϵ϶ 
 
 
How many ϶ s are there: 
 
8 
 
ЦШЦЦШШЦЦШЦШЦШЦШШЦЦШШШЦЦШЦЦ 
 
 
How many Ц s are there: 
 
9 
 
ѨѬѨѨѬѬѨѬѨѬѨѬѬѬѨѨѬѬѨѨѨ 
 
 
How many Ѩ s are there: 
 
10 
 
ӇӇӇӉӇӉӇӉӉӇӉӉӇӉӉӇӇӇӉӇӉӇӉӉӇӇӉӇӉӉӇӇ 
 
 
How many   Ӈ s are there: 
